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Differential games is an important tool for analyses in economics and management that 
involve more than one actor and conditions that change over time. Since the two aspects 
often occur, differential games is a natural tool for many analyses. Examples are strategic 
interactions between firms and governments under conditions of accumulation of capital, 
knowledge or pollution. However, the tool is not generally used because the material is 
rather complicated. The standard reference is BaÕar and Olsder (1995), and rightly so, 
but this book is not easily accessible for a larger academic community and, as the authors 
of  the  book  under  review  write,  examples  are  not  drawn  from  economics  and 
management science. The material was introduced into the literature in a clear way by 
Starr and Ho (1969a, 1969b) (a reference that is missing in the book under review) but 
since then more theory has developed and many applications have appeared so that a 
book like this was needed. 
The first question is whether the book serves the main purpose of being better accessible 
and providing a wide range of applications. The problem is that an intermediate level of 
mathematics is required to understand the intricacies of control theory and differential 
games. This book chooses a middle course between mathematical precision and a toolbox 
for practitioners and can be criticized by people who prefer one of the two, but the book 
succeeded, in my view, quite well in its purpose. By presenting heuristic arguments for 
the theorems, the book gives insight in the theory and by presenting a large number of 
examples and applications, the book teaches how to work with the theorems. The choice   2
of applications is largely driven by previous work of the authors, which is understandable 
and fine, but it would have been nice if the reference list had also covered other major 
application areas such as fiscal policy games. May be the organization of this part could 
also have been improved. The distinction between examples and applications is a bit odd 
(e.g. section 7.1.4), some repetition occurs, and sometimes a concept is introduced that is 
explained later (like the Hotelling rule on page 126). 
The core chapter of the book is chapter 4. Since differential games combines game theory 
and optimal control theory, it makes sense to start with introductory chapters 2 and 3 into 
the two fields. Although the authors write on page 3 that differential games is a subclass 
of game theory now and not an extension of optimal control theory anymore, I think that 
this book shows that it still is predominantly optimal control theory. The book chooses 
the Markovian Nash equilibrium as the central concept. Given Markovian strategies for 
the other players, each player has to solve an optimal control problem and core theorems 
4.1 and 4.2 are essentially control theorems. I consider this, by the way, as a strong point 
of differential games and not a weak point. The fit with game theory, however, is more 
problematic and had deserved more attention. Three issues are important here. First, the 
book chooses to work in continuous time but game theory traditionally works in discrete 
time, because one feels uncomfortable with the concept of instantaneous reaction. This 
shows, for example, in chapter 6 on trigger strategies where the authors have to deviate 
from this general framework and introduce a reaction time. Later in the chapter this is 
repaired but the final result becomes complicated and it is not so clear whether new 
insights in trigger strategy equilibria are acquired. Moreover, game theory got further in 
this topic by introducing renegotiation proof equilibria. Second, some discussion on the 
concept of information structure would have been useful. Traditionally differential games 
focuses on information on the current state, initial state or past states and distinguishes 
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria concepts (see chapter 5). However, game theory does not 
use the concept of Stackelberg equilibria anymore but describes hierarchical play as a 
Nash equilibrium with a special information structure. In fact, figure 2.2 in chapter 2 is a 
Stackelberg game. It would have been a simultaneous Nash game if the two nodes in the 
middle  had  been  one information  set.  The book  misses  a  chance  to  prevent  possible 
confusion here. Last but not least, the issue of subgame perfectness is not overall clear   3
but this requires some introduction and will be discussed below. The contribution of 
differential  games  to  the  main  body  of  game  theory  is,  in  my  view,  especially  the 
introduction of a (deterministic) state equation that represents accumulation of capital, 
knowledge, pollution and so on. Traditional dynamic game theory is mainly concerned 
with repeated games and Bayesian updates of uncertain factors. 
Most applications in the book (and outside) have a standard pattern of comparing open-
loop and Markov perfect Nash equilibria for the problem under consideration. This can 
be seen in sections 9.5, 10.1, 11.1, 12.1.2 and 12.3.1. Also the treatment of differential 
games with special structures (chapter 7) shows this pattern: see for linear state games, 
examples 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 and for linear quadratic games, theorem 7.2. The approach in 
the book is mostly the usual approach that is found in the literature. The open-loop Nash 
equilibrium is derived with Pontryagin’s maximum principle with degenerate Markovian 
strategies, and the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium is derived with the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equations. However, the core chapter 4 is set up a bit differently. The idea here 
is again that given Markovian strategies for the other players, each player has to solve an 
optimal control problem and can either use the maximum principle (theorem 4.2) or the 
HJB equations (theorem 4.1). Then it is shown that a Markovian Nash equilibrium is 
always time-consistent (theorem 4.3) but not always subgame perfect. Theorem 4.4 states 
that if the conditions of theorem 4.1 hold not only on but also off the equilibrium path, 
the equilibrium is subgame perfect. Finally, on page 105 it is written that any stationary 
Markovian Nash equilibrium (for infinite time problems) is subgame perfect, provided it 
is independent of the initial state. This story is correct but it would have helped the reader 
to explain whether or not the use of the HJB equations in finite time problems (such as in 
section 11.1) automatically leads to a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium. In the chapter on 
control  theory  (chapter  3)  it  is  shown  that  the  HJB  equations  result  from  dynamic 
programming, and in the chapter on game theory (chapter 2) it is shown that subgame 
perfectness is a natural extension of dynamic programming (page 24). Given the main 
thrust of the book, I think these issues had deserved even more clarity than the book 
already provides. For example, it would have been interesting to present an application 
with a time-consistent Markovian Nash equilibrium that is not subgame perfect. BaÕar 
and Olsder (1995) used the terms global and stagewise to make distinctions (pages 141-  4
142). Later it became common to make distinctions between closed-loop and feedback. 
The authors consider this to be unfortunate on page 59 but it may in fact be useful. It is 
also important to relate this topic to the widely used concept of (pre-)commitment (pages 
107 and 243). In discrete time, these issues are easier to understand but the authors prefer 
to work in continuous time and confusion may arise. 
The authors chose to write one chapter on stochastic differential games (chapter 8) with 
some applications on pages 275 and 282. The topic deserves a whole book, but I think it 
is worth to give the reader of this book some idea of this important topic. 
In general, I expect the book to be useful for researchers in economics and management 
who want to use the tool of differential games and that it will be widely cited in the near 
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